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Political actors in Northern Ireland, like those in most conflicts, have drawn 
international comparisons to their situation with other high profile situations.  While 
there have been few formal proposals to directly import solutions from other conflicts 
there have been many attempts to use international comparison to explain the origin 
and nature of the conflict and to seek to gain sympathy by linking the Northern 
Ireland conflict to one of which a targeted audience has more knowledge and/ or 
strong views.  There have also been attempts to promote other policy objectives via 
association with international events or organisations.  This article seeks to examine 
the manner in which Irish nationalists have made links with the Israel-Palestinian 
conflict.  It analyses two separate components of Irish nationalism.  The foreign 
policy of the Republic of Ireland is analysed not only as the official expression of 
moderate Irish nationalism but also because it sets a broader ideological context 
within which even more radical voices are situated.  Secondly it examines how Sinn 
Féin, as the largest expression of radical Irish nationalism and  the majority party 
among the nationalist community in Northern Ireland, have sought to utilise 
comparison with the Palestinian cause in their political discourse over the period of 
the recent conflict and peace process. 
 
There are of course also lively academic debates around the validity of such 
international comparisons.  While a lot of academic writing on Northern Ireland tried 
to avoid the inevitable controversies of such comparison by focusing on the 
specificity of the Northern Ireland case and perhaps weakening its contribution to 
analysis of the conflict, there were significant debates in particular about the impact 
of settler colonial ideology, the role of consociational theory and in the 1990s the 
utility of comparative study of peace processes, in particular the Northern Ireland 
South African and Middle East cases.1  However as such comparisons have been 
well articulated elsewhere, this chapter focuses on the particular comparisons and 
linkages made by political actors. 
 
Ulster Unionists and Israel 
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Divided World (Oxford University Press, 2001); John McGarry, John and Brendan O'Leary  
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While the focus of this article is Irish nationalism and their identification with the 
Palestinian cause this requires some contextualisation and in particular a brief 
analysis of the mirroring support by Ulster unionists for the state of Israel.  Prior to 
the end of the Cold War, unionists had made limited use of international contacts.  
Ulster unionists have traditionally seen the wider international community as 
unsympathetic.  They have frequently been described as having a ‘siege’ mentality – 
and not just by opponents.2  Such parallels as were drawn tended to be with what 
were perceived as similar communities under siege such as Israel, Turkish Cypriots 
and apartheid South Africa or other ‘abandoned’ British settlers such as the white 
community in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.3  Ulster unionists have also seen the Northern 
Ireland conflict as classically ‘asymmetric’. Unionist politician Clifford Smyth quotes 
an Admiral Hugo Hendrik Bierman of the then South African Navy: ‘in the nature of 
this protracted war our enemies have the opportunity to attack time and again and to 
lose, whereas we shall have but one opportunity to lose’.4  In a similar vein and of 
direct relevance to this volume The Orange Order, comparing Northern Ireland to 
Israel, said: ‘Having been betrayed before they [the Ulster people] are very alert now, 
for as Louis Gardner wrote, ‘Ulster, like Israel, can only lose once’.5    
 
Ulster Unionists perceived Britain to be under pressure from an international 
community sympathetic to Irish nationalism and they had an exaggerated sense of 
the diplomatic pressure flowing from such sympathy.  Nonetheless unionists saw 
successive British Governments as being capable of negotiating a United Ireland 
without any significant threat to their own position, or to the rest of the British state.   
This view is expressed in various ways but generally emphasises that Northern 
Ireland is kept at arms length or is treated differently from England, Scotland or 
Wales.6  Unionists regularly drew attention to the record of the British Government in 
‘abandoning’ its supporters in settler colonies when it decided to withdraw – again 
emphasising the identification with ‘settlers’ under siege.  Independent unionist MP 
Jim Kilfedder for example said, ‘all over the world where Britain has been kicked in 
the teeth by violence she has surrendered to the terrorists. Northern Ireland ...is no 
exception’, and ‘Northern Ireland will not be treated as the Khyber Pass and the 
North West Frontier of the 1970s, providing reminiscences for Ministers and for 
military mess dinners.’ In response to guarantees from British ministers about 
unionists’ position he retorted: ‘were not such assurances given from these Dispatch 
Boxes to the unfortunate people of Kenya who were humiliated by the Mau-Mau ? 
But subsequently those evil men were welcomed by politicians here who had earlier 
condemned them.’7  Again the ‘people’ of Kenya in Kilfedder eyes were all setters.  
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Ulster Unionists quite unselfconsciously moved between making common cause with 
traditional ‘settler colonial’ situations such as Rhodesia and Kenya to identification 
with isolated Israel, under siege in a hostile region.   As white rule became not only 
discredited but increasingly unstable it was clear that drawing such parallels did the 
unionist cause more harm that good and nostalgia for colonialism is rarely heard after 
the 1980s.  However parallels with Israel are still regularly drawn by mainstream 
unionist politicians and they remain strong supporters of Israeli state policy.  Senior 
Ulster unionist Stephen King referred to ‘Unionists' predominant identification with 
Israel’8    Dean Godson, Trimble’s biographer claimed that ‘Northern Ireland is one of 
the very few parts of Europe where there is a very wide measure of popular support 
in the majority community for the State of Israel.’ 9   Indeed in 2002 Belfast was 
festooned with Israeli flags in unionist areas – prompting a wave of Palestinian flags 
in nationalist districts.  The Israeli flags were backed up by supportive graffiti such as 
‘Go on Sharon’ and ‘The West Bank of the Lagan [a unionist area] backs Ariel 
Sharon’.10  Again, after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006 there was widespread 
unionist support for Israel.11  However there are signs of one or two cracks in this 
previous almost universal support.  David Ervine of the small Progressive Unionist 
Party attended a protest rally  during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 200612 and 
Ulster Unionist MP John Taylor, a member of the Middle East sub-committee of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in a statement on the death of 
Arafat, said his legacy was ‘the international community's acceptance of the principle 
of an independent sovereign state of Palestine’ and that ‘A great memorial to his life 
would be the creation of a democratic Palestine’.13  While Taylor is well know for his 
maverick views it was still a very rare example of some support for Palestinians from 
a senior unionist figure. 
 
The support for Israel and the Palestinians by unionists and nationalists respectively 
is therefore more than a simple reflection of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’.  Just 
as many unionists make common cause with Israel as an isolated state, based on 
settlers and their descendents and surrounded by hostile forces Irish nationalists saw 
the Palestinian cause through the lens of a nation struggling to achieve statehood 
and/or within a wider anti-imperialist ideology. 
 
 
Moderate Nationalism and its support for Palestinian statehood 
 
Moderate Irish nationalism, as represented through the Irish Government and Irish 
foreign policy has long expressed its support for Palestinian statehood and this 
inevitably also frames the context within which northern nationalists make common 
cause with Palestinians.14   The Irish Government has since 1967 supported UN 
resolution 242 and explicitly called for a full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied 
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territories.  It balanced this position with support for Israel’s right to exist in security.15  
Ireland had in fact recognised Israel in 1963 and despite its position on Palestinian 
self-determination was one of very few countries acceptable to both Israel and Egypt 
(UAR) as a country to provide troops to the expanded UNTSO after the 1967 war.   
Indeed while the numbers involved had been small up to that point Ireland had 
military officers in the region since the formation of the UNOGIL observer mission in 
1958.16
 
This position has been maintained by all governments and is the context for regular 
statements on the Israel-Palestine conflict.  In 2004 then Foreign Minister Brian 
Cowen made a statement welcoming the Geneva Initiative and the Saudi / Arab 
League plan and criticised in very strong terms the Israeli security wall. 17   The 
succeeding Minister Dermot Ahern intervened during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 
2006 saying ‘I have condemned and I condemn again today the rising toll of death 
and destruction, the blockade of Lebanon, the desperate conditions under which 1.5 
million Palestinians are living under effective siege in Gaza.’18  This political support 
is also seen in the Irish official development aid budget.  In 2006, the budget includes 
provision for over €4 million to be spent in the Palestinian territories, including 
support for UNRWA. 19   Previous development aid support has been given to 
UNRWA, Ministry of Education for the Palestinian Authority, UNDP, Bethlehem 
University and local civil society organisations.20
 
This level of diplomatic support for Palestinian self determination, combined with 
recognition of Israel’s right to exist in security has been consistent over many years.  
In seeking an explanation for this position it is possible to look at a number of broader 
themes in Irish foreign policy.  It certainly draws on Ireland’s own history and reflects 
a context where Irish foreign policy maintained a broad support for movements for 
national self determination.21  This was true in sub Saharan Africa in the late 1950s 
and 1960s.  It formed the context for the intervention in the Congo in the 1960s, to 
prevent what was seen as a colonial attempt to divide the country and in addition 
allowed the Irish state, as a relatively new UN member, to show support for the 
emerging concept of peacekeeping.  In more recent years it was reflected in policies 
on Cyprus, East Timor and Western Sahara.    
 
Irish foreign policy on Palestine is also a reflection of and consistent with support for 
other strong themes within modern Irish foreign policy – a concern with conflict 
resolution, strong support for the United Nations, for international law and for human 
rights. Comments by ministers often refer back to UN Security Council Resolutions, 
the judgement of the International Court of Justice (on the wall) and the humanitarian 
condition of Palestinian refugees and those living in the occupied territories.  The 
1996 White Paper on Irish foreign policy, while acknowledging the duty of a state to 
protect its national interests, set out this self image as follows:  
Ireland’s foreign policy is about much more than self-interest. For many of us 
it is a statement of the kind of people we are. Irish people are committed to 
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the principles set out in Article 29 of the [Irish] Constitution for the conduct of 
international relations: the ideal of peace and friendly co-operation amongst 
nations founded on international justice and morality.22  
 
In late 2000, just before Ireland joined the Security Council, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Brian Cowen argued against an analysis of foreign policy on the basis of 
values versus interests. He said it was not an either/or situation because small states 
could not compete in a power-seeking international system run by realist principles. 
Ireland, he argued, ‘like most small nations has always known that a multilateral 
rules-based international order is in our national interest. We would like to think, and I 
believe with much justification that we have demonstrated this, that our commitment 
to liberal internationalism is also based on principle.’23
 
It is also possible to argue as Rory Miller has done that Ireland’s position on 
Palestine has been beneficial to the development of its economic relationships with 
the wider Arab World.24  The 1996 White Paper, indeed, acknowledges that ‘Ireland 
is small and hugely dependent on external trade for its well-being’.25   While it is 
difficult to separate the importance of different motivating factors in foreign policy 
some indications can be drawn by comparison with other cases.  For example when 
Ireland was on the UN security council in 2001-2, Ireland seriously annoyed a 
stronger trade partner (Morocco) to support Polisario on the question of Western 
Sahara.  Indeed on the UN Security Council in 2001-2 Ireland in many respects was 
the leading supporter of the Polisario position, with no obvious ‘realist’ benefits.26     
 
Clearly as a small state Ireland has had limited opportunities to influence politics in 
the Middle East.  It has sought to strengthen EU intervention but in common with its 
diplomatic approach on all issues of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
it is not the policy of the Irish government to articulate an ‘opening position’ on EU 
negotiations on foreign policy statements and the Government tends to loyally 
support CFSP positions once agreed.  While it is widely reported that Ireland adopts 
a position of support for the Palestinians in such talks there is limited public detail on 
the degrees of difference between the Irish approach and what is ultimately agreed at 
EU level.  However in a review of developments in EU foreign policy in the 1980s, 
former Taoiseach Garret FitzGerald asserted 
 There was a major shift in European foreign policy [in the 1970s] which 
eventually secured the assent of all the member states although at the start of 
that period only three countries, France, Italy and Ireland held the position of 
seeing the Palestinian problem as one of fundamental importance requiring 
action to provide the Palestinians with a homeland and a State of their own 
whereas the majority of States saw it still as a refugee problem. From that 
position these countries have shifted towards the position which we then 
held.27  
A little more detail is revealed by Ireland’s most recent period on the UN Security 
Council which provided a context whereby Ireland had some degree of influence at 
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the highest levels of international politics and was also doing so in a much more open 
forum than the Council of EU Foreign Ministers.  The detail of the Irish position was 
indeed articulated at length over this period.  The changes to the Council’s 
membership in January 2001, and Ireland’s broad support for the rights of the 
Palestinian people altered the previous balance on the Council.  The US had become 
more wary of using its Security Council veto to block resolutions that are critical of 
Israel, being a little more conscious, in the immediate post 9-11 period (if not later) of 
the negative impact such vetoes have in the Arab world and internationally.  In the 
Security Council term before Ireland’s membership, a Palestinian-promoted motion 
proposed  in December 2000 calling for a UN Observer Force in the Occupied 
Territories got only eight votes, and so the US did not have to veto, as nine positive 
votes from among the 15 members are required to pass a resolution.  Ireland’s 
support for the idea of Palestinian statehood, meant that a passing majority of nine 
votes was now more likely—potentially forcing the US to engage more fully.  
 
The first significant Council discussion on Palestine during Ireland’s term was in 
March 2001.  Ireland’s statements with regard to the Palestinian issue28 stressed five 
key themes: firstly the right of the Security Council to concern itself with the Middle 
East; secondly, Israel’s right to security within recognised borders; thirdly, the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to a state; fourthly, condemnation of 
terrorism, the counter-productive nature of Palestinian violence, Israel’s excessive 
reaction to such violence and illegal Israeli settlements; and finally Israel’s right to 
defend itself along with its obligation to do so in accordance with international 
humanitarian law. Ireland abstained on this draft resolution, which sought to deploy 
UN observers in the occupied Palestinian territories without Israeli agreement, as 
they believed that no state would deploy troops in such circumstances. 
 
Ireland’s support for Palestinian statehood was demonstrated most clearly in 
December 2001 when Ireland’s support for a draft resolution promoted by the Arab 
states encouraged three other non-permanent Council members to vote in favour, 
seeing Ireland’s lead as giving them diplomatic cover, despite a certain US veto (and 
obvious British displeasure).29 The vetoing of this draft resolution and a recognition 
that there was now a majority on the Council in favour of moderate motions critical of 
Israel were important factors in pressurising the US towards supporting the principle 
of Palestinian statehood. In March 2002, faced with a moderate Arab resolution that it 
would again have had to veto to defeat, the US introduced its own draft, which 
endorsed the principle of Palestinian statehood and welcomed the involvement of the 
Quartet as a mediating group in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. 30  The US also 
introduced its own draft of proposed resolutions dealing with the conflict on three 
occasions in late March/April 2002:calling for an Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian 
cities and welcoming Secretary-General Annan’s initiative to send a fact-finding 
mission to Jenin to investigate claims of an Israeli massacre of civilians in that city.31 
In late 2002, however, following the killing of UN employees by Israeli forces, the US 
shifted back to more traditional defence of Israel and vetoed a draft resolution, one 
that had been supported by Ireland.32  
 
                                                 
28 For details see, for example, statements and vetoed resolution on 15 and 27 March. 2001, 
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Obviously Ireland was not the only player, or even the most significant factor in the 
changing politics of UN and US positions on the Middle East, however 
notwithstanding considerable pressure from the USA, Ireland held a fairly 
consistently pro-Palestinian position on the Council and by helping to create a block 
of nine positive votes had some degree of influence over US strategy at this time.  An 
analysis of Irish foreign policy on the Palestinian question shows therefore that it is 
maintained even when realist considerations (such as not annoying the USA) were at 
stake.  Therefore while trade links with the Arab world are not irrelevant to Ireland’s 
position on Palestine, the willingness to pursue this policy in the face of considerable 
pressure from the USA indicates that its roots in Irish foreign policy are deeper and 
more fundamental and draw on themes other than economic self interest. 
 
 
Sinn Féin and the Palestinian Question 
 
An analysis of Sinn Féin’s position on the Middle East offers a different perspective to 
that of the Irish state’s foreign policy, given the party’s links to the IRA and their 
espousal of a more militant politics on Irish unity and international affairs.  Sinn Féin 
has elaborated a consistent position in support of the PLO and Palestinian statehood 
and while its position goes beyond that articulated by the Irish state it is not 
fundamentally in contradiction with it.   There are three key dimensions to Sinn Féin’s 
use of the Palestinian question over the past thirty years, which follow more or less 
chronologically .  Firstly there is a linking of the IRA and the PLO as ‘equivalent’ 
armed national liberations movements and the use of an internationalist policy on 
questions such as Palestinian statehood in an effort to defend Sinn Féin from attacks 
by others on the left who sought to dismiss them as inward looking conservative 
nationalists.  Secondly there were strong links between the Northern Ireland, South 
African and Oslo peace processes in the early to mid 1990s.  Thirdly in the aftermath 
of the 1998 Belfast Agreement links with radical causes and involvement in 
international attempts at conflict resolution, serve to strengthen the Sinn Féin 
leaderships claims to remain ‘radical’ in their politics, while also strengthening their 
claim to be peacemakers.   
 
The outbreak of the modern conflict in the late 1960s and occurred around self 
conscious use of a  ‘civil rights’ discourse and early international comparisons were 
inevitably with the situation of blacks in the southern states of the USA.  The very title 
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, the tactics of peaceful marches and the 
focus on issues such as discrimination in jobs, housing, voting and police behaviour 
sought to draw on the international sympathy and focus on the USA, to raise the 
international profile of Northern Ireland and to try and embarrass the British 
Government into a programme of reform.  This comparison continued throughout the 
conflict. Orange Order33 marches through nationalist areas have been compared to 
the Klu Kluk Klan marching through Harlem and a senior member of the Clinton 
administration alledgedly compared the then Northern Ireland police force, the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), to leaving Alabama and Georgia with all white cops’.34  
As the conflict developed, Republicans continued this focus but also added a more 
anti-imperialist and revolutionary rhetoric.  This saw the use of images of figures such 
as Che Guevera and expressions of ‘solidarity’ with leftist movements in Latin 
America but by far the most common comparison throughout the following decades 
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was with the ANC struggle against apartheid.  This was regularly seen in publications, 
on painted murals in nationalist areas and in speeches by senior Sinn Féin leaders.  
It was in this wider context that comparisons with the Palestinian struggle for 
statehood and with the PLO itself were made 
 
In the early years of the conflict, Sinn Féin and the IRA sought to link their campaign 
for Irish unity to that of the Palestinians for statehood and in particular sought to link 
the IRA and the PLO. This is mostly strongly seen in the 1970s and early 1980s and 
its most visible manifestation was in murals in nationalist areas.  One prominent 
example in Belfast depicted armed IRA and PLO members under the slogan ‘IRA-
PLO one struggle’.35  By linking their wider political strategy to organisations and 
‘struggles’ which were widely supported in Ireland such as those of the ANC and 
PLO. Sinn Féin sought to provide a wider political context for their politics.  This was 
regularly seen in the weekly Sinn Féin newspaper An Phoblacht and became 
stronger as the organisation moved to the left under the influence of the Adams 
leadership in the 1980s.  Interestingly the comparison with the PLO continued in An 
Phoblacht throughout this period, notwithstanding the reliance of the IRA on fund 
raising among the Irish diaspora in the USA, where links with Palestinians would 
hardly have been popular. 
 
During the 1990s there was a widespread academic and public discourse on the 
interconnections and possible lessons to be learned by a comparative study of the 
then emerging peace processes in South Africa, Northern Ireland and the Oslo 
process in the Middle East.  This type of comparison went well beyond those who 
used it for nationalist rhetoric.  Some such as Michael Cox argued that the previous 
attempts by Sinn Féin to link themselves to the ANC and PLO created its own 
pressure in a reverse fashion in the 1990s.  If the IRA campaign was in part justified 
by some comparison to the ANC and PLO then the ANC and PLO involvement in 
peace processes added to the other pressures on the Sinn Féin leadership to do 
likewise.36  However the Sinn Féin leadership played up these comparisons and 
regularly referred to them in their public speeches and publicity.37  The South African 
example link was the more enduring as its peace process obviously succeeded and 
was then used after the end of apartheid as both an example and a lever.  However 
links with the Palestinian cause continues right through this period.  This helped them 
to cement the Irish process and helped persuade their own supporters that this was a 
road they could go on given the widespread support for the PLO and ANC among 
their target voters. 
 
In the post Agreement (and post armed conflict) era in Northern Ireland, Sinn Féin 
has sought to present an image of their party as both continuing their radical tradition, 
in a context where they may fear losing some of their more militant supporters and 
has in parallel sought to strengthen their image as ‘peace-makers’ and international 
actors by a regular engagement in other conflicts.   On the question of maintaining a 
radical political agenda this is obviously primarily reflected in domestic policy and in 
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their continuing campaign on Irish unity38, however international politics gives a wider 
context to Sinn Féin’s politics and allows them use international situations to build 
their domestic support base among key target audiences.  Sinn Féin continues to 
articulate a leftist position, consistent with the ‘anti-globalisation’ movement in the 
post 1998 Agreement era.  It is highly critical of the global economic system and of 
the dominant role of the USA, despite the considerable significance which they attach 
to a strategic involvement with the United States regarding the peace process. The 
party was very active in the anti-war movement on Iraq – providing speakers for all of 
the major rallies and opposing the use of Shannon airport by the US military and they 
have a highly critical position of US foreign policy in the Middle East in particular.39  
More explicit links with the Palestinian cause continued throughout this time period.  
Sinn Fein have called for an end to Israel’s preferential trade access to the EU unti 
they withdarw from the West Bank and Gaza.40  Dr Jamal Zahalka, a member of the 
Palestinian Authority, spoke at the ‘Bloody Sunday’ anniversary march in 2005 one of 
the most high profile republican events.41  Gerry Adams condemned Israel’s invasion 
of Lebabon in 2006 42 , while party spokesperson on foreign affairs Aengus O 
Snodaigh TD attacked the EU over their decision to suspend funds to the Palestinian 
authority after the election of Hamas43  
 
Inevitably these policy positions are used against them in the USA but there is no 
evidence that the party has sought to distance itself from these policies or demote 
their profile.  Neither is there any evidence that the party feels itself under pressure to 
do so from its support base.  The domestic importance of their international positions 
is sometimes lost on Sinn Féin’s political opponents and even some of its 
international support.  There was, for example, considerable debate about Gerry 
Adams’ visit to Cuba in 2001 and his very public and friendly reception by Fidel 
Castro.  Supporters of the peace process in the US Congress were very vocal in their 
attacks on the visit.44    Despite this, Sinn Féin not only proceeded with the visit but 
promoted it heavily via their press office.  The 2002 general election manifesto 
showed no sign that the party was concerned that their position on Cuba was a 
problem for them and they explicitly called for an end to the United States' embargo 
of Cuba.45  Likewise an examination of editorials in conservative newspapers such 
as the Daily Telegraph46 shows little evidence that a repetition of ‘attacks’ linking 
Sinn Féin to organisations such as the PLO is regarded as entirely positive publicity 
by Sinn Féin in the Irish domestic context. 
 
In the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks there was clearly a much more limited political 
space for any return to ‘armed struggle’.  However as Western policy makers 
struggled to come to terms with the threat of al Qaeda, it was contrasted by some 
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commentators with ‘old’ terrorism – which was perceived (rightly or wrongly) to have 
more rational political aims around which government could negotiate, compared to 
al Qaeda.   The Daily Telegraph attacked what it perceived to be the influence of this 
sort of logic in the British government in an editorial in 2003 saying  
 
Mr Blair also appears to believe that clear distinctions can be made between 
different kinds of terrorism. This holds that terrorism for no discernible, 
rational purpose (such as September 11) is beyond the pale. By contrast, 
terrorism that has clear political purpose (a united Ireland as demanded by 
the IRA, a Palestinian state as demanded by the PLO and Hamas) can be 
conciliated.47
 
The domestic impacts of links with popular international causes are cemented by the 
party’s high profile involvement in international conflict resolution attempts.  There is 
little doubt that Sinn Féin played a positive role in the Basque Country where they 
had long standing ties to Basque militants in Batasuna.  The initial forum where 
supporters of Batasuna and the moderate Basque nationalists discussed the 
possibilities of a post-ceasefire common strategy was called the ‘Irish Forum’, such 
was the level of involvement by Irish nationalists. 48   Senior negotiator Marin 
McGuinness has also been involved in the Tamil-Sri Lanka conflict with a number of 
visits to the area.  While the involvement of Sinn Féin in the Israel-Palestinian conflict 
has been marginal compared to these other examples, the 2006 visit by Gerry 
Adams to the region was presented in this light.49  A senior Sinn Féin figure, writing 
in the local press explicitly did so  
 At great personal risk Martin McGuinness visited Sri Lanka and spoke to the 
country's president and the Tiger Tamils about making peace between 
enemies. Gerry Adams's trip to the Middle East was as perilous. He also 
recently visited the Basque country and Spain following ETA's decision to 
ceasefire.50
 
This international involvement serves to heighten the party’s profile, to constantly 
remind Irish voters of the party’s involvement in the Northern Ireland peace process 
and to link them centrally with ongoing issues of concern for potential supporters in a 
manner which is rarely open to opposition politicians.  For those with whom they build 
links the perceived ‘success’ of the Irish peace process in the international media 
allows other groups to use this opportunity to pressurise their own local state actors.  
For example Basques welcomed the involvement of Sinn Féin as they could contrast 
the refusal of the PP Spanish Government to engage in any talks, with the 
willingness of the British to do so in Northern Ireland.  It also strengthened the case 
of those advocating an ETA ceasefire as the IRA was held in high regard by most 
ETA members.  During Gerry Adams’ visit to Palestine in 2006, Sinn Féin compared 
the attempts to isolate the Hamas led government with their own isolation prior to the 
beginning of the peace process, arguing that it would not work and should be 
abandoned.51
 
Irish nationalism’s engagement with the Israel-Palestine conflict, for both the Irish 
Government and for Sinn Féin has arisen from strong themes which are also visible 
in other contexts.  For the Irish state, their position in support of Palestinian 
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statehood (and Israel’s security) has been consistently expressed over many years, 
even at times (such as their Security Council term) when there was considerable 
pressure from the USA to refrain from doing so.  Give the close links between Ireland 
and the US and the high level of US investment in Ireland this might be expected to 
have a defining influence on foreign policy decisions.  However ultimately the support 
for Palestinian’s right to statehood was deemed of such importance as to risk some 
tensions with the USA.  This went beyond the particulars of the Palestinian question 
and was based on a firm belief that this is of fundamental importance in the context 
of both the current international security situation and in order to strengthen the UN 
system and international law more broadly.  Sinn Féin, while having a similar position 
on the fundamentals of the issue, use a more radical rhetoric, historically supporting 
the PLO’s campaign (unlike the Irish Government) and attacking the Irish 
Government / EU decisions to suspend funding to the Palestinian Authority after the 
Hamas victory in the 2006 elections.  They also place the Palestinian question in a 
wider context, in particular in their case, within their critique of US foreign policy and 
within an international profile which draws on the anti-globalisation movement on the 
one hand while continuing in parallel to build alliances with groups such as the 
Palestinians and Basques in conflict resolution.   
 
 
 
 
